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CASENOTES AND
COMMENTS
ADMISSIONS TAX ON MOVIE THEATERS INFRINGES
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A NOVEL ARGUMENT
THAT HAS WORKED... SO FAR
I. INTRODUCTION
The city of Montclair has a problem. The city's movie theaters are
drawing large crowds from neighboring communities. 1 Because of the
theaters' operations, the city must expend an inordinate amount of public
resources in sanitation services, road repair, fire and traffic services, and
police and crowd control.2 However, the sales tax revenue from the
movie theaters' concession counters is insufficient to pay for all of these
city services which the theater owners enjoy.3 Since many of the theater
patrons are not residents of Montclair,4 the city is unable to impose on
them an alternate means of collecting revenue, such as a property or in-
come tax. As a result, the other Montclair taxpayers effectively subsidize
the theater operations.
The City Council meets to discuss the problem. A proposed solu-
tion is to impose a tax on admissions5 to all entertainment events within
the city in order to pay for the public services which those entertainment
businesses utilize.6 Would such a tax be constitutional? Would your an-
swer be different if the only entertainment events within the city affected
by the tax were two movie theaters and two adult bookstores with view-
ing booths?
1. Public Hearing-Staff Report No. IX: Recommend Adoption of Ordinance No. 86-630
Creating an Admissions Tax, [hereinafter Hearing], at 6, Montclair, Cal. (September 2, 1986).
2. Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Montclair City Council, at 2, Montclair, Cal.
(September 15, 1986) (testimony of City of Montclair Police Chief Caldwell, Fire Chief Scott
Kenley, and Director of Public Works Sawtell).
3. Hearing, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Id.
5. A tax upon the receipts from the sale of admissions is a form of sales tax. See generally
68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 62 (1973). The state can also require licenses of those
who operate public amusements and entertainment. See generally 4 AM. JUR. 2D Amusements
and Exhibitions §§ 29-34 (1962); Annotation, Validity of License Tax or Fee on Show or Place
of Amusement, 58 A.L.R. 1340 (1929), 111 A.L.R. 778 (1937).
6. Hearing, supra note 1, at 6.
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This issue was addressed in the recent California case, United Artists
Communications, Inc. v. City of Montclair7 ("United Artists"). In
United Artists, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
an admissions tax imposed by the city of Montclair ("City") on sporting
and entertainment events as applied to United Artists (" UA" )8 violated
the first amendment of the United States Constitution.9 The court relied
on two cases for this result. First, the United States Supreme Court case,
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 'o
("Minneapolis Star"), which struck down a state tax on ink and paper as
being an unjustified, discriminatory taxation of the press.'" Second, the
California case, Festival Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Pleasant Hill 2 ("Fes-
tival Enterprises"), which relied on Minneapolis Star to strike down an
"admissions tax" as an unjustified discriminatory tax on theater
owners. 13
United Artists has potentially the most significant nationwide impli-
cations of any California case decided in 1989. The decision will surely
be used by owners of movie theaters and other similar entertainment
businesses to strike down admissions taxes in cities throughout Califor-
nia14 and across the country"5 which have adopted them and rely on
7. 209 Cal. App. 3d 245, 257 Cal. Rptr. 124, review denied, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110
S. Ct. 280 (1989).
8. In addition to United Artists, the other plaintiffs were Vista Theaters and General
Theatre Corporation. Id. Hereinafter, all plaintiffs will be referred to collectively as "UA."
9. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
10. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
11. Id. at 585.
12. 182 Cal. App. 3d 960, 227 Cal. Rptr. 601, review denied, (1986).
13. Id. at 962, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
14. In 1986, when Montclair adopted its Ordinance, approximately twenty California cit-
ies imposed an admissions tax. Hearing, supra note 1, at 6. See, e.g., Fox Bakersfield Theatre
Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 2d 136, 222 P.2d 879 (1950) (discussing an admissions tax
adopted by the City of Bakersfield, California).
15. Admissions taxes are not unique to California cities. See, e.g., Metropolis Theatre Co.
v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913) (upholding, on equal protection grounds, an admissions
tax imposed by the City of Chicago, Illinois); Friends of Chamber Music v. City and County of
Denver, 696 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1985) (Denver, Colorado, municipal ordinance); Deluxe Thea-
tres, Inc. v. City of Englewood, 198 Colo. 85, 596 P.2d 771 (1979) (Englewood, Colorado,
municipal ordinance); City of Boulder v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 179 Colo. 420, 501
P.2d 123, reh'g denied, (1972) (Boulder, Colorado, municipal ordinance); Town of Cicero v.
Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 3d 10, 357 N.E.2d 1118, 2 I11. Dec. 675, reh'g denied,
(1976) (Cicero, Illinois, municipal ordinance); Spotlight Miniature Golf, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 279 S.W.2d 795, reh'g denied, (1955) (Kentucky state statute); Villa Nova Night
Club, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 256 Md. 381, 260 A.2d 307 (1970) (Maryland state
statute); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Burn Brae Dinner Theatre Co. Inc., 72 Md. App. 314,
528 A.2d 546 (1987) (Maryland state statute); Fridley Recreation & Service Co., v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 292 Minn. 260, 194 N.W.2d 584 (1972) (Minnesota state statute); Beach v.
Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E.2d 328 (1966) (South Carolina state statute); State v. Rope,
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them for revenue.
This casenote examines the reasoning in United Artists. It will be
argued that: (1) the court misinterpreted first amendment analysis; (2)
United Artists is distinguishable from the above authorities it relied upon;
and (3) the decision is unjust because it inequitably shifts a business' bur-
den of paying for city services to the City's other taxpayers.
II. UNITED AR TISTS COMMUNICA TIONS, INC V. CITY OF MONTCLAIR
A. Statement of Facts
In 1986, the City passed an ordinance adopting the "Admissions
Tax Law of the City of Montclair"'16 ("Ordinance"). The Ordinance im-
posed a six percent tax17 on the price of an admission ticket18 to any
event. "Events" were defined as "motion pictures, theatrical perform-
ances, musical performances, operas, athletic contests, exhibitions of art
or handicrafts or products, lectures, speeches, fairs, circuses, carnivals,
menageries, or any other activity conducted for which an admission
ticket is sold."' 9 Certain events for charitable or religious purposes were
exempt, so long as they were not for profit.2"
The Ordinance included a purpose clause in order to "establish a
fundamental relation between the tax and the object of the ordinance."21
The purpose clause stated that the tax was "to raise revenue to assist in
419 S.W.2d 890 (1967) (Texas state statute); Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Texas Boxing
Enterprises, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 817 (1960) (Texas state statute); City of Portsmouth v. Ports-
mouth Catholic Elementary School P.T.A., 217 Va. 199, 227 S.E.2d 691 (1976) (Portsmouth,
Virginia, municipal ordinance); Ropo, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 574, 409 P.2d 148
(1965), reh'g denied, (1966) (Seattle, Washington, municipal ordinance); Telemark Co., Inc. v.
Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 28 Wis. 2d 637, 137 N.W.2d 407 (1965) (Wisconsin state
ordinance).
16. MONTCLAIR, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 86-630 (1986) ("AN ORDINANCE OF THE
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MONTCLAIR ADDING ARTICLE 5 TO CHAP-
TER 5 OF TITLE 3 OF THE MONTCLAIR MUNICIPAL CODE RELATING TO AN
ADMISSIONS TAX"). "This article shall be known as the 'Admissions Tax Law of the City
of Montclair.'" Id. Section 3-5.501.
17. Id. Section 3-5.504 provides:
When a charge or admission price for admission is paid for the right or privilege of
being admitted to any premises, there is hereby levied and assessed, and there shall be
paid and collected, a tax in an amount equal to six percent (6%), or the integrated
sales tax rate in San Bernardino County attributable to all state and local sales taxes,
whichever is greater, on the price of an admission ticket for the privilege of admission
to any event held.
18. " 'Admission ticket' shall mean any charge whether or not so designated for the right
or privilege to enter and occupy a seat or space . . . ." Id. Section 3-5.503(1).
19. Id. Section 3-5.503(2) (amended 1988).
20. MONTCLAIR, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 86-630 § 3-5.529 (1986).
21. Public Hearing-Staff Report No. VIII: Recommend Adoption of Ordinance No. 86-
630 Creating an Admissions Tax, at 4, Montclair, Cal. (Sept. 15, 1986).
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covering the cost of providing municipal services required by businesses
covered under this article."22
UA owned, operated and/or managea movie theaters located within
the City.23 There were other businesses within the City subject to the
tax;2 4 however, ninety percent of the tax was borne by UA's theaters and
two adult bookstores with viewing booths.2"
UA sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the
admissions tax impermissibly burdened first amendment protected activi-
ties without adequate justification.26 The trial court found the tax consti-
tutional and entered judgment for the City.27 UA appealed.2"
The California Court of Appeal reversed and held that the tax was
unconstitutional as applied to UA.29 The California Supreme Court de-
nied review,3° and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.3"
B. The Trial Court's Holding and Reasoning
At trial, Judge Hyde declared the Montclair admissions tax consti-
tutional without explanation.32 However, it is reasonable to assume that
Judge Hyde was persuaded by the prior ruling in Edwards Theatres Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga 33 ("Rancho Cucamonga") since
the City cited to that case extensively in its trial briefs.34
Rancho Cucamonga, like United Artists, involved a challenge to a
22. MONTCLAIR, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 86-630 § 3-5.502 (1986). The services intended
to be covered included, litter control, street sweeping, sanitation collection, fire prevention, law
enforcement, street maintenance and traffic control, among other things. Hearing, supra note
1, at 6.
23. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 246-47, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
24. The other businesses were the Holiday Skating Rink, the Laff Stop, the Grand Prix
Raceway, four nightclubs/restaurants which charge cover charges, and two adult bookstores
with viewing booths. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 247, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
27. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 248, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
28. Id.
29. Id., at 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
30. Id., at 245, 257 Cal. Rptr. 124, review denied, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 280
(1989).
31. Id.
32. In the judgment filed December 1, 1987, Judge Hyde gave no explanation why he ruled
as he did. See Judgment, United Artists, etc. v. City of Montclair, No. OCV 39705 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1987).
33. No. OCV 39736 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987).
34. See Trial Statement of Defendants at 6, 18, United Artists, etc. v. City of Montclair,
No. OCV 39705 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987).
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city's admissions tax. 3 In upholding the Rancho Cucamonga tax, the
trial judge distinguished Minneapolis Star, reasoning that the Minnesota
ink and paper tax was unconstitutional because it singled out the press
without an adequate justification. 36 The Rancho Cucamonga tax, on the
other hand, did not single out protected activities.37 Since the tax ap-
plied to non-protected businesses as well as to protected ones,38 the court
held that the tax would pass constitutional muster.39
The Rancho Cucamonga court noted that municipal power to raise
revenue for local purposes is not only appropriate, but vital.4 Accord-
ingly, the court upheld the Rancho Cucamonga admissions tax against
the first amendment challenge.4" Judge Hyde probably relied upon this
reasoning when he upheld the Montclair admissions tax.
C. The Holding and Reasoning of the Court of Appeal
The California Court of Appeal reversed, declaring the Montclair
Admissions Tax unconstitutional as applied to UA.42 The Montclair ad-
missions tax, like the use tax in Minneapolis Star and the admissions tax
in Festival Enterprises, appeared to apply to a broad range of busi-
nesses. 43 However, the court of appeal stated that, in reality, the tax fell
"disproportionately upon businesses engaged in protected speech: two
movie theaters and two adult book stores with viewing booths."'
The court distinguished Festival Enterprises where the only busi-
nesses affected by the tax were movie theaters, protected by the first
amendment.45 In United Artists, the court found that in addition to the
theaters, there were other businesses nominally subjected to the tax.46
Yet, despite the existence of other potentially non-protected businesses
affected by the tax, the appellate court found the Ordinance unconstitu-
tional for three reasons.47 First, as in Minneapolis Star, a disproportion-
35. Statement of Decision at 2, Edwards Theatres Circuits, Inc. v. Rancho Cucamonga,
No. OCV 39736 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987).
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Statement of Decision at 11, Edwards Theatres Circuits, Inc. v. Rancho Cucamonga,
No. OCV 39736 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987).
41. Id.
42. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d 245, 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. 124, 129, review denied, cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989).
43. Id. at 252, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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ate amount of the tax (ninety percent) was paid by the few protected
businesses.4" Second, other businesses subject to the tax could avoid it.49
Third, other businesses subject to the tax, such as the nightclubs, also
appeared to be engaged in protected speech and that, according to the
court, did not help the City's position.5"
The court of appeal held that UA's uncontradicted evidence51
proved that the Montclair Admissions Tax discriminated against those
engaged in protected speech.52 Despite its broadly-worded applicability,
the tax fell almost exclusively on four businesses, all of which were en-
gaged in protected speech. 53
The court noted that "a statute challenged under the First Amend-
ment 'must be tested by its operation and effect.' " The tax had the
effect of singling out protected businesses.55 Accordingly, based on its
interpretation of the holding of Minneapolis Star and Festival Enterprises,
the court held the Montclair admissions tax unconstitutional as applied
to UA.56
48. Id
49. Id. For example, the skating rink could drop its admission fee and increase its skate
rental fee, the nightclubs could drop their admission fee and instead institute a minimum drink
charge or dinner charge. Id. UA, on the other hand, was bound by its distribution agree-
ments, and therefore did not have a readily available means to avoid the admissions tax. Id.
50. Id. This last argument seems to imply that the Ordinance is invalid because, rather
than singling out a few protected businesses for burdensome taxation, it is aimed at a broad
class of protected businesses for burdensome taxation.
51. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 248, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (all facts of the case were stipulated).
52. Id. at 252-53, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 128. The court stated that the tax was not one of
general applicability, as it was not targeted at all businesses. Id.
53. Id
54. Id. at 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931)
(emphasis omitted)).
55. Id.
56. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The court also cited City of Alameda
v. Premier Communications Network, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 148, 202 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1984),
as another instance where a California court had applied Minneapolis Star to declare a city
ordinance unconstitutional. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 249-50, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 126-
27. In Premier, the Court of Appeal invalidated an ordinance to the extent that it imposed a
business license tax on a provider of a television subscription service. Premier, 156 Cal. App.
3d at 157, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
Premier Communications Network, Inc. is a provider of "Home Box Office," a pay televi-
sion movie service. Id. at 152, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 686. "Premier, as a disseminator of motion
pictures, news and other information and entertainment programming, engages in conduct
protected by the First Amendment guaranties of freedom of speech and press." Id., 202 Cal.
Rptr. at 686.
The court in Premier held that since the ordinance placed a differential burden upon
television subscription service businesses unjustified by any compelling interest of the City, the
ordinance as applied to Premier violated the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Id. at 157, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
[Vol. 10
ADMISSIONS TAX
III. BACKGROUND: THE RELATIONSHIP OF TAXATION TO THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The First Amendment Guarantee of Freedom of Speech
The first amendment prohibits Congress from making any laws
which infringe on freedom of speech or of the press." The fourteenth
amendment similarly protects these fundamental rights from infringe-
ment by state action or municipal ordinances adopted under state
authority.58
Many theories explain the tremendous value of the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech. The right of free speech is designed and
intended to remove government restraints from the forum of public dis-
cussion. 59 By protecting our right of free speech, the Constitution pro-
motes political discourse, culture, and assures individual self-fulfillment
free from government censorship.' Under Justice Holmes' famous
"marketplace of ideas" theory, the first amendment enables society to
find the truth: "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."'"
1. Protected vs. Unprotected Speech
Despite the absolute language of the first amendment, not all speech
falls within its protection.62 There are certain classes of speech which the
United States Supreme Court has recognized as "unprotected," the regu-
lation of which does not raise any constitutional problem. 63 Examples of
unprotected speech include the "lewd and obscene,"' the "profane," 6 5
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.
For sake of convenience, throughout the remainder of this casenote, "freedom of speech"
will be used as an abbreviation to refer to each of the freedoms guaranteed by the first amend-
ment (other than religion). This follows Professor Tribe's approach. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 at 785 n.2 (1988).
58. The fourteenth amendment makes applicable to the states the rights guaranteed by the
first. Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
59. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
60. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). See also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[G]overnments might ... seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.").
61. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
63. Id. at 571-72.
64. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court in Miller defined obscene
material, which may be constitutionally banned, as that which meets the following three-part
1990]
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the "libelous,"" and the "insulting or 'fighting' words."67 These classes
of speech have such slight social value that any benefit they may provide
is outweighed by society's interest in order and morality.68
Exhibiting motion pictures is protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments69 because this is a significant medium for communicating
ideas.7" Even though motion pictures are produced and exhibited for a
profit, profit motive does not prevent them from being a form of pro-
tected expression;7 nor does it matter that they are intended to entertain
as well as inform.72
2. Content-Based Government Regulation
Once it is determined that the speech in question is protected by the
test: First, the average person applying contemporary community standards would find the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Second, the material depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law. And third, the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Id. at 24.
65. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971). A defendant had been convicted for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words,
"Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16. The Court found this was not obscene, i.e., not erotic, id. at 20,
and reversed the conviction. Id. at 26.
66. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official can
recover for libel relating to his official conduct, if he can show actual malice, i.e. that the
statement was made with knowledge of its falsehood, or with reckless disregard for the truth).
See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (non-public official or figure can
recover for libel without having to show that the statement was made with knowledge of its
falsehood, or with reckless disregard for the truth).
67. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (upholding a state law
which the Court found did no more than prohibit face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a
breach of the peace).
68. Id. at 572.
69. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1951). See also Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("[M]otion pictures, programs broadcast by radio
and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the
First Amendment guarantee."). Accord Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 689, 441
P.2d 281, 284, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 (1968) ("[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is
included within the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
70. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501. "[Motion pictures] may affect public
attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
71. Id. at 501-02. The activities of the adult bookstores' viewing booths are probably also
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 66 (1981) ("[N]ude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from
official regulation."). Accord Morris v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. 3d 553, 564, 652 P.2d 51, 57,
186 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (1982) ("A ban on nude dancing cannot be sustained on the theory
that it regulates only conduct and does not impinge upon protected speech.").
72. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501.
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first amendment, determining whether the challenged government regu-
lation is constitutional depends, in part, on whether the regulation is con-
tent-based or content-neutral. A regulation is content-based if it restricts
speech because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.73 If the
regulation is found to be content-based, it is constitutional only if it sur-
vives strict scrutiny;74 the government must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling government interest 75 and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that end.76
Governments rarely admit that their regulation is content-based.
Thus, courts look at two aspects of the regulation in order to determine
whether a challenged regulation is in fact content-based. First, a regula-
tion is content-based if it is facially discriminatory, its language specifi-
cally targets the subject matter or content of the speech.77 Second, even
if the regulation is facially non-discriminatory, it is deemed content-
based if the government intended the regulation to single out certain
types of speech because of its subject matter or content.78
3. Content-Neutral Government Regulation
Where the government regulation of protected speech is content-
neutral, targeted at something other than the subject matter of the
speech, courts will apply a balancing test to determine the validity of the
73. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
74. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). Strict scrutiny involves the most exact-
ing level of judicial review; hardly any government action ever survives it. In the often-quoted
words of Professor Gunther, the scrutiny is, " 'strict' in theory and 'fatal' in fact." Gunther,
The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
75. 454 U.S. at 270. In Widmar, the Court held that the state's interest, achieving greater
separation of church and state than already insured under the United States Constitution, was
not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based discrimination against religious speech. Id.
at 276.
76. Id. at 270. "Narrowly tailored" has generally meant that the regulation must be the
least restrictive means of achieving the government's objective. See, e.g., Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinance which prohibited handing out literature on a pub-
lic street). The city's objective, prevention of litter, could have been achieved by the less re-
strictive means of punishing those who actually throw papers on the street. Id at 162. But see
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (upholding municipal sound
amplification regulation). The Court held that so long as the means chosen are not substan-
tially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, a regulation will not be
invalid simply because that interest could be served by less restrictive means. Id. at 2758.
77. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1971) (invalidating ordinance
which prohibited picketing in front of schools, except if the school was involved in a labor
dispute).
78. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (invalidating school
regulation that prohibited wearing armbands). The Court found the regulation was intended
to avoid political controversy about the Vietnam war. Id. at 509-10.
1990]
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regulation. 79 A content-neutral regulation will be upheld if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest,80 and leaves open am-
ple alternative channels for communication."'
B. Taxation: The Rule of Minneapolis Star
A tax, like any other government regulation, may infringe on the
guarantees of freedom of speech or the press. In 1983, the Supreme
Court decided the landmark case of Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue. 82 The Court struck down a state
use tax8 3 on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the produc-
tion of publications.84 The Court held that the tax violated the first
amendment of the United States Constitution by singling out the press
without any satisfactory justification. 5
1. Content-Based Strict Scrutiny Test Applied
The Minnesota legislature had imposed a use tax on the cost of pa-
per and ink products used in the production of a publication. 6 The first
$100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed by a publication in any calen-
dar year was exempt from the tax. 7 The effect of the $100,000 exemp-
tion was that only a handful of publishers paid any tax at all, and even
fewer paid any significant amount of tax.88 Therefore, the tax penalized
79. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordinance that prohibited
operation of loudspeakers or any other instrument emitting loud noises on public streets).
"[T]he need for reasonable protection... from the distracting noises of... such... devices
justifies the ordinance." Id. at 89. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidat-
ing ordinance that prohibited distribution of literature on city streets). The city interest in
keeping streets clean was insufficient to save the ordinance. Id. at 162. See generally L. TRINE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 at 791-92 (1988).
80. "Significant government interest" is an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753, 2760 (1989) (city's interest
in avoiding excessive sound volume withstands a first amendment challenge); See also Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 50-54 (1983) (school district's
interest in preserving school mailboxes for their lawful purpose outweighs interest of a union
denied access rights to those mailboxes); See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
81. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980).
82. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
83. A use tax is a value-based tax on the use, consumption, or storage of tangible property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (5th ed. 1979).
84. 460 U.S. at 592-93.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 577.
87. Id. at 578.
88. Id. at 591.
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a few of the largest newspapers because the exemption selected this nar-
rowly defined group to bear the full burden of the tax.89
The Supreme Court noted that the first amendment does not pro-
hibit all regulation of the press.90 Both state and federal governments
can subject newspapers to generally applicable taxation without creating
constitutional problems.9" However, the Minnesota tax was not a gener-
ally applicable tax, but rather a special tax which applied only to certain
publications protected by the first amendment.92 The tax was facially
discriminatory, singling out the press for special treatment.93
In addition to the fact that the tax was facially discriminatory, the
Supreme Court inferred discriminatory intent. The Court was concerned
that discriminatory taxation could be used by the government to check
critical comment by the press.94 Discriminatory treatment of the press
suggested that the goal of the tax was to suppress expression, and such a
goal was presumptively unconstitutional. 95 "When the State singles out
the press ... the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat
can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by the
press .... 96
Thus, finding both a facially discriminatory tax and intent to dis-
criminate against the press, the Court subjected the tax to strict scrutiny.
"A tax that singles out the press.., places a heavy burden upon the State
to justify its action." 97 The discriminatory tax would be found invalid
unless the state could assert a counterbalancing interest of compelling
importance that it could not achieve without differential taxation.98
The tax failed the test. While Minnesota's main interest of raising
89. 460 U.S. at 592. Tailoring the tax to single out a few members of the press presented
"such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota [could] justify the
scheme." Id.
90. Id. at 581.
91. id See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ("[O]wners of
newspapers are [not] immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the
government.").
92. 460 U.S. at 581. A tax need not fall exclusively upon activities protected by the first
amendment in order to fall within the scope of Minneapolis Star. In Acara v. Cloud Books,
Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), the Court, in discussing its decision in Minneapolis Star, stated: "We
imposed a greater burden of justification on the State even though the tax was imposed on a
nonexpressive activity, since the burden of the tax inevitably fell disproportionately-in fact,
almost exclusively-upon the shoulders of newspapers exercising the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of the press." Id. at 704.
93. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581-82.
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 592-93.
98. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
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revenue is critical to any government, standing alone it did not justify
differential taxation of the press.99 Minnesota could have raised revenue
through a general business tax, thus avoiding the censorial threat implicit
in a tax that singles out the press.' °° Since Minnesota had offered no
compelling justification for its tax on the use of ink and paper, the Court
held that the tax violated the first amendment.' 0 '
2. The Rule of Minneapolis Star Extended to Admissions Taxes on
Movie Theaters
In 1986, the First District of the California Court of Appeal in Festi-
val Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Pleasant Hill 10 2 struck down as unconstitu-
tional an admissions tax as applied to theater owners.'0 3 The city of
Pleasant Hill had enacted a five percent tax on the admission price of
"sporting events, movie theatres, concerts, shows, museums, perform-
ances, displays and exhibitions within the city.""'' The court of appeal
held that the tax imposed "an impermissible burden on protected speech
in violation of... the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution."' 0' 5 In so holding, the court relied on the authority
of Minneapolis Star, noting that "special deference must be paid to busi-
nesses engaged in protected speech."'0 6 The court reiterated that com-
mercial motion pictures are protected speech.' 7 Although the ordinance
was broadly worded to apply to other forms of entertainment, in reality,
the tax singled out the theaters owned by Festival Enterprises; they were
99. Id. at 586.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 593. See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)
(invalidating sales tax on general interest magazines, that exempted newspapers and religious,
professional, trade, and sports journals). The discrimination in Minneapolis Star took two
forms. First, the use tax treated the press differently from other enterprises. Second, by the
$100,000 exemption, the tax targeted a small group of newspapers. Both types of discrimina-
tion were present here, even though there was no evidence of improper censorial motive. Se-
lective taxation of the press-either singling out the press as a whole, or targeting individual
entities of the press-poses a particular danger of abuse by the state. The Arkansas exemption
operated much like the $100,000 exemption in the Minnesota use tax because it treated some
magazines less favorably than others. Thus, in order to justify its differential taxation, the state
had to show that its regulation was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and was
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Arkansas failed to meet this heavy burden. Id. at 228-34.
102. 182 Cal. App. 3d 960, 227 Cal. Rptr. 601, review denied, (1986).
103. Id. at 962, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
104. Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
105. Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
106. Id. at 964, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (citing Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
107. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 963, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v, Wilson
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952)).
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the only businesses in the city subject to the tax. 108 The city admitted
that it did not know when, if ever, any other business besides the theaters
would appear and become subject to the tax.'19
The court stated that motion picture exhibition, a protected activity,
cannot be singled out for discriminatory tax treatment, "unless the state
asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it can-
not achieve without differential taxation."'  The city's only interest in
enacting the tax was to provide revenue for street repairs. " ' Citing Min-
neapolis Star, the court invalidated the tax. "2 However, in dicta, the
court implied that the tax might have been upheld if it was justified by
increased use of city services required by the theaters' operation, i.e. po-
lice protection, street repair, or sanitation collection. 1 13
IV. ANALYSIS OF UNITED ARTISTS
A. Preliminary First Amendment Analysis
UA's activity in the instant case, movie theater operation, is pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 Given that UA is en-
gaged in protected speech, the question becomes whether the admissions
tax is targeted at the subject matter or content of UA's activities, and is
thus content-based. 115
The Montclair admissions tax is not facially discriminatory. By its
language it covers a broad range of entertainment events without regard
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 964, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
111. Id. at 962-63, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
112. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 964-66, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 602-04.
113. Id. at 964, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
114. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. UA's activity is also protected by the
California Constitution. "A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 2.
For prudential reasons, the better view is that where both the state and federal constitu-
tions are implicated, a court should interpret the state constitution first. This principle has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Val-
ley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This principle has also
been recognized in state courts. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,
29 Cal. 3d 252, 261-63, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870-71 (1981). See generally
S. Mosk, The State Courts, American Law: The Third Century (1976).
The court of appeal in United Artists failed to consider the California Constitution. Ac-
cordingly, a full analysis of this case under the state constitution is beyond the scope of this
casenote.
115. The tax is content-based if it is facially discriminatory, specifically targeted, by its
language, at the subject matter or content of the activities. Alternatively, even if the tax is
facially non-discriminatory, it is content-based if the City intended to single out UA because of
the subject matter or content of its activities. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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to subject matter.116 However, the tax has the effect of singling out UA
for taxation; ninety percent of the tax is borne by UA. 17 Thus, the issue
becomes whether this is sufficient to infer discriminatory intent. The tax
is content-based only if there was an intent by the City to discriminate
against UA because of the subject matter of its activities.118
Two possibilities for further analysis of the case are now presented.
Either, as in Minneapolis Star, infer the City's intent to discriminate
against the subject matter of UA's activities, and thereby find the tax
content-based.119 If the tax is content-based, it is invalid unless it sur-
vives strict scrutiny;120 the tax must be necessary to serve a compelling
government interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 12 1 Or,
if there is no reason to infer an intent by the City to discriminate against
the subject matter of UA's activities, the tax should be found content-
neutral. If the tax is content-neutral, a balancing test should be applied;
the tax is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels for
communication. 122
B. The City Did Not Intend to Discriminate Against the Subject
Matter of UA 's Activities
The Supreme Court in Minneapolis Star inferred intent because
of the concern that discriminatory taxation could be used by the gov-
ernment to check critical comment by the press. 123 Discriminatory treat-
ment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, sug-
gested that the goal of the tax was to suppress expression. 
124
However, this concern of government censorship which made it
proper for the Court to infer discriminatory intent in Minneapolis Star is
absent in United Artists. Movie theaters, unlike newspapers, are not a
typical avenue for critical comment of the government. Unlike a news-
paper editorial, a controversial film shown at a movie theater is not a
credible threat to the City Council of Montclair, such that they would
find a need to exercise censorship in the form of a discriminatory tax.
Unlike a facially discriminatory tax that singles out the press, a facially
116. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
123. 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
124. Id.
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neutral admissions tax that has the effect of singling out movie theaters
does not credibly suggest that the goal of the tax is suppression of
expression.
There is a second reason not to infer discriminatory intent in United
Artists. In Minneapolis Star, the ink and paper tax was unrelated to spe-
cial characteristics of the press and that suggested that the goal of the tax
was to suppress expression.1 25 In United Artists, however, the Montclair
admissions tax is justified by special characteristics of theater operations,
making it difficult to suggest that the goal of the tax was to suppress
expression. Movie theaters require certain public services, including lit-
ter control, street sweeping, sanitation collection, fire prevention, law en-
forcement, traffic control, and potentially crowd control. The Montclair
admissions tax was imposed for the specific purpose of providing these
public services to the businesses taxed. 126 This further distinguishes the
Montclair tax from the tax invalidated in Minneapolis Star. 127
Thus, the Ordinance cannot be found to be content-based. It is not
a facially discriminatory tax, nor is there evidence of government intent
to use the tax to suppress expression. Therefore, the rule of Minneapolis
Star should not apply to United Artists; the Ordinance should not have
been subjected to the strict scrutiny test imposed on content-based regu-
lations. The Ordinance should have been found content-neutral and ana-
lyzed accordingly.
C. Analysis of the Admissions Tax as Content-Neutral
Rather than applying strict scrutiny as did the court in United Art-
ists, the tax should have been subjected to the lesser level of scrutiny
imposed on content-neutral regulations. The tax was not targeted at the
content of UA's activities, but rather at the problem of paying for City
services used by UA.'2 8 As mentioned above, a content-neutral govern-
ment regulation is constitutional, provided that it is narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leaves open ample alternative
channels for communication.
129
Under this intermediate level of scrutiny, the Montclair Ordinance
125. See id. at 585-86. The purpose of the ink and paper tax, raising revenue, was insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to justify special treatment of the press. Id.
126. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
127. In determining whether a rule applicable to one protected activity should be extended
to another, each must be assessed for first amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for
each may present its own problems. Southwestern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557 (1975).
128. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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is valid. The City adopted the Ordinance to serve a significant govern-
ment interest. The tax is necessary to achieve an equitable distribution of
the benefits of public services and a corresponding equitable burden of
paying for them. This interest can only be achieved through differential
taxation. As noted above, the movie theaters now enjoy the benefits of
certain government services, yet without differential taxation, the burden
of paying for them will fall upon the other taxpayers in the City.' 3°
The Ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve this interest. The
purpose clause clearly stated that the Ordinance was enacted to pay for
the city services utilized by the movie theaters.' The Ordinance im-
posed a nominal, six percent tax on the price of admission to achieve this
interest. 32 It did not employ means substantially broader than necessary
to achieve this interest; 133 for example, it did not impose an outright ban
on movie theaters.
Finally, the tax does not unduly constrict channels for communica-
tion. A six percent tax on the price of admission, 42 cents on a $7.00
ticket, has a minor effect, if any, on UA's ability to attract movie theater
patrons, who ultimately bear the burden of the tax. 134 Movie theater
patrons will not be dissuaded from attending UA's Montclair theaters
because of the tax. The cost of transportation (gasoline, bus fare, etc.) to
a theater in another city that has no admissions tax offsets this additional
42 cents. Thus, patrons will probably not abandon Montclair as a movie
theater destination.
Nor can it be argued that the tax will result in movie patrons turn-
ing to alternate, less expensive forms of entertainment, such as home
videos. Most people who opt to watch home videos for $2.00-$4.00 per
show, because going out to the movies is substantially more expensive,
will probably do so whether the latter costs $7.00 or $7.42. Thus, UA is
not in danger of losing its current audience to home videos because of the
admissions tax.
Accordingly, the balancing of UA's right of freedom of speech
against Montclair's significant interest in protecting the rights of other
city taxpayers favors the City. To enforce UA's right of freedom of
speech while disregarding the rights of other taxpayers is harsh and arbi-
130. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
131. MONTCLAIR, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 86-630 § 3-5.502 (1986).
132. MONTCLAIR, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 86-630 § 3-5.504 (1986).
133. See discussion of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra note 76.
134. The Theatre Association of California, Inc. argued that any admissions tax would be
passed on to the theaters' patrons. Stipulation of Facts, exhibit 7G, United Artists, etc. v. City
of Montclair, No. OCV 39705 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987).
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trary in itself. 3 ' Therefore, under the test for a content-neutral govern-
ment regulation, the Ordinance should have been found constitutional.
1. The Montclair Ordinance Is Distinguishable from the Tax
Invalidated in Festival Enterprises
The City's justification for its admissions tax, raising revenue to pay
for the city services utilized by the entertainment businesses, also distin-
guishes it from the tax invalidated in Festival Enterprises. 136 The tax in
Festival Enterprises was not imposed for any purpose justified by the spe-
cial characteristics of movie theaters; rather it was for general revenue
purposes only. 137 As noted previously, dicta in Festival Enterprises indi-
cated that the court would have upheld an admissions tax imposed for
the purpose Montclair stated, raising revenue specifically to pay for the
city services utilized by the businesses taxed.
38
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The decision in United Artists is unjust because it inequitably distrib-
utes the burden of paying for city services among Montclair's taxpayers.
A consequence of the case is that the bulk of the burden of paying for the
city services enjoyed by the theaters will have to be borne by the other
taxpayers within the City. Fairness dictates that the beneficiaries of city
services, in this case movie theater owners, should somehow contribute
to the cost.
United Artists has additional financial consequences for California
cities and cities in other states that choose to follow this decision. The
decision will deprive many smaller cities of needed revenue from admis-
sions taxes, while permitting other, larger cities to continue to impose
such taxes based solely on the fact that those cities contain popular, non-
first amendment protected entertainment events.1 39
United Artists has implications not only for exhibitors of motion pic-
tures and adult bookstores with viewing booths, but logically extends to
135. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). See also, Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989) (upholding city ordinance designed to protect
residents from excessive sound volume from musical performances held in a park).
136. 182 Cal. App. 3d 960, 227 Cal. Rptr. 601, review denied, (1986).
137. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
139. For example, the city of Inglewood, California, whose primary entertainment facility,
The Forum, hosts mostly sporting events. Sporting events are arguably unprotected by the
first amendment. Therefore, it would appear likely that Inglewood could impose an admis-
sions tax that would be valid under the reasoning of the court in United Artists.
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all first amendment protected entertainment events " for which an ad-
mission fee is charged. For example, performance art, art museums, mu-
sical performances, theater, opera, amusement parks, etc., are all forms
of entertainment protected by the first amendment. 141 Accordingly, the
reasoning in United Artists applies equally as well to an admissions tax
imposed on any of them.
VII. CONCLUSION
In invalidating the Montclair admissions tax, the California Court
of Appeal cited as its authority Minneapolis Star and Festival Enter-
prises. 14' However, the Montclair tax is distinguishable from the taxes
invalidated in both of those cases. First, the Montclair tax is justified by
the special characteristics of movie theater operations and is not for gen-
eral revenue purposes. Second, the threat of government censorship of
critical comment, which justified invalidating the Minnesota tax on ink
and paper, is not a credible threat in United Artists. Third, the City's
interest in achieving an equitable distribution of the burden of paying for
city services is of significant importance that cannot be achieved without
differential taxation. Since the Ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve
that interest, it should have been upheld.
Robert A. Willner*
140. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (entertainment falls
within the first amendment guarantee).
141. See id.
142. United Artists, 209 Cal. App. 3d 245, 253, 257 Cal. Rptr. 124, 129, review denied, cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989).
* Thanks are owed to Professor Lawrence B. Solum for his ideas and direction in the
preparation of this note. Thanks are also owed to Karen L. Poston, Nancy A. Rubin, Cherise
M. Wolas and Dennis T. Yokoyama for their constructive comments.
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